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Background Independence,
Diffeomorphism Invariance, and the
Meaning of Coordinates∗
Oliver Pooley
Abstract Diffeomorphism invariance is sometimes taken to be a crite-
rion of background independence. This claim is commonly accompanied
by a second, that the genuine physical magnitudes (the “observables”) of
background-independent theories and those of background-dependent (non-
diffeomorphism-invariant) theories are essentially different in nature. I argue
against both claims. Background-dependent theories can be formulated in
a diffeomorphism-invariant manner. This suggests that the nature of the
physical magnitudes of relevantly analogous theories (one background free,
the other background dependent) is essentially the same. The temptation to
think otherwise stems from a misunderstanding of the meaning of spacetime
coordinates in background-dependent theories.
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1 What’s so Special about General Relativity?
According to a familiar and plausible view, the core of Einstein’s general the-
ory of relativity (GR) is what was, in 1915, a radically new way of understand-
ing gravitation. In pre-relativistic theories, whether Newtonian or specially
relativistic, the structure of spacetime is taken to be fixed, varying neither in
time nor from solution to solution. Gravitational phenomena are assumed to
be the result of the action of gravitational forces, diverting gravitating bodies
from the natural motions defined by this fixed spacetime structure. Accord-
ing to GR, in contrast, freely-falling bodies are force free; their trajectories
are natural motions. Gravity is understood in terms of a mutable spacetime
structure. Bodies act gravitationally on one another by affecting the curva-
ture of spacetime. “Space acts on matter, telling it how to move. In turn,
matter reacts back on space, telling it how to curve” (Misner et al., 1973, 5).
Note that the first of the claims in the quotation is as true in pre-relativistic
theories as it is in GR, at least according to the substantivalist view, which
takes spacetime structure in such a theory to be an independent element of
reality. The novelty of GR lies in the second claim: spacetime curvature varies,
in time (and space) and across models, and the material content of spacetime
affects how it does so.
This sketch of the basic character of GR has two, separable elements. One
is the interpretation of the metric field, gab, as intrinsically geometrical: grav-
itational phenomena are to be understood in terms of the curvature of space-
time. The second is the stress on the dynamical nature of the metric field: the
fact that it has its own degrees of freedom and, in particular, that their evolu-
tion is affected by matter. While I believe that both of these are genuine (and
novel) features of GR, my focus in this paper is on the second. Those who
reject the emphasis on geometry are likely to claim that the second element
by itself encapsulates the true conceptual revolution ushered in by GR. Non-
dynamical fields, such as the spacetime structures of pre-relativistic physics,
are now standardly labelled background fields (although which of their fea-
tures qualifies them for this status is a subtle business, to be explored in
what follows). On the view being considered, the essential novelty of GR is
that such background structures have been excised from physics; GR is the
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prototypical background-independent theory2 (as it happens, a prototype yet
to be improved upon).
Although this paper is about this notion of background independence,
the question of the geometrical status of the metric field cannot be avoided
entirely. In arguing against the interpretation of GR as fundamentally about
spacetime geometry, Anderson writes:
What was not clear in the beginning but by now has been recognised is that one
does not need the “geometrical” hypotheses of the theory, namely, the identifica-
tion of a metric with the gravitational field, the assumption of geodesic motion,
and the assumption that “ideal” clocks measure proper time as determined by
this metric. Indeed, we know that both of these latter assumptions follow as ap-
proximate results directly from the field equations of the theory without further
assumptions. (Anderson, 1996, 528)
There is at least the suggestion here that GR differs from pre-relativistic
theories not only in lacking non-dynamical, background structures but also
in terms of how one of its structures, the “gravitational field”, acquires ge-
ometrical meaning: the appropriate behaviour of test bodies and clocks can
be derived, approximately, in the theory. Does this feature of GR really dis-
tinguish it from special relativity (SR)?
Consider, in particular, a clock’s property of measuring the proper time
along its trajectory. In a footnote, Anderson goes on to explain that “the
behaviour of model clocks and what time they measure can be deduced from
the equations of sources of the gravitational and electromagnetic fields which
in turn follow from the field equations” (Anderson, 1996, 529). But the gener-
ally relativistic “equations of sources of the gravitational and electromagnetic
fields” are, on the assumption of minimal coupling, exactly the same as the
equations of motion of an analogue specially relativistic theory.3 It follows
that whatever explanatory modelling one can perform in GR, by appeal to
such equations, to show that some particular material system acts as a good
clock and discloses proper time, is equally an explanation of the behaviour
of the same type of clock in the context of SR. Put differently, it is as true in
SR as it is in GR that the “geometrical” hypothesis linking the behaviour of
ideal clocks to the (in this context) non-dynamical background “metric” field
is in principle dispensable.4
2 In what follows I focus specifically on the notion of background independence that
is connected to the idea that background structures are non-dynamical fields. In doing
so, I am ignoring several other (not always closely related) definitions of background
independence, including those given by Gryb (2010) (which arises more naturally in the
context of Barbour’s 3-space approach to dynamics) and by Rozali (2009) (which arises
naturally in string theory). A more serious omission is lack of discussion of the definition
given by Belot (2011), which is motivated by ideas closely related to the themes of this
paper. I hope to explore these connections on another occasion.
3 That it is only in the GR context that material fields merit the label “sources of the
gravitational field” is, of course, irrelevant.
4 In this context it is interesting to consider Fletcher’s proof that the clock hypothesis
holds up to arbitrary accuracy for sufficiently small light clocks (Fletcher, 2013). As is
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2 Einstein on General Covariance
The previous section’s positive characterisation of GR’s essential difference
from its predecessors goes hand-in-hand with a negative claim: GR does not
differ from its predecessors in virtue of being a generally covariant theory. In
particular, the general covariance of GR does not embody a “general principle
of relativity” (asserting, for example, the physical equivalence of observers in
arbitrary states of relative motion). In contrast, the restricted, Lorentz covari-
ance of standard formulations of specially relativistic physics does embody
the (standard) relativity principle. In Michael Friedman’s words, “the prin-
ciple of general covariance has no physical content whatever: it specifies no
particular physical theory; rather it merely expresses our commitment to a
certain style of formulating physical theories” (Friedman, 1983, 55).
Notoriously, of course, Einstein thought otherwise, at least initially.5 The
restricted relativity principle of SR and Galilean-covariant Newtonian theo-
ries is the claim that the members of a special class of frames of reference,
each in uniform translatory motion relative to the others, are physically equiv-
alent. In such theories, although no empirical meaning can be given to the
idea of absolute rest, there is a fundamental distinction between accelerated
and unaccelerated motion. Einstein thought this was problematic, and offered
a thought experiment to indicate why.
Consider two fluid bodies, separated by a vast distance, rotating relative
to one another about the line joining their centres. Such relative motion is in
principle observable, and so far our description of the set up is symmetric with
respect to the two bodies. Now, however, imagine that one body is perfectly
spherical while the other is oblate. A theory satisfying only the restricted
principle of relativity is compatible with this kind of situation. In such a the-
ory, the second body might be flattened along the line joining the two bodies
only because that body is rotating, not just with respect to other observable
bodies, but with respect to the theory’s privileged, non-accelerating frames of
reference. Einstein deemed this an inadequate explanation. He claimed that
explicit in Fletcher’s paper, his result is as applicable to accelerating clocks in SR as it
is to arbitrarily moving clocks in GR. Fletcher’s proof assumes only that light travels
on null geodesics; it does not make any assumptions about the fundamental physics, or
even (specific) assumptions about the deformation of the spatial dimensions of the clock.
All of this is consistent with one of the morals of the “dynamical approach to special
relativity”, defended in Brown (2005) and Brown and Pooley (2006), that it is no more of
a brute fact in SR than in GR that real rods and clocks, which are more or less complex
solutions of the laws governing their constituents, map out geometrical properties in the
way that they do. What Fletcher’s proof illustrates is that some interesting results are
nonetheless obtainable from minimalist, high-level physical assumptions. (Note that, in
contrast to the position taken in Brown and Pooley (2006), I am here assuming that the
structure encoded by the flat metric field of special relativity corresponds to a primitive
element of reality, as was entertained in Brown and Pooley (2006, 82, fn 22).)
5 The evolution of Einstein’s views is covered in detail by Norton (1993, §3). In this
section I largely follow Norton’s narrative.
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appeal to the body’s motion with respect to the invisible inertial frames was
an appeal to a “merely factitious cause.” In Einstein’s view, a truly satisfac-
tory explanation should cite “observable facts of experience” (Einstein, 1916,
113). A theory which in turn explains the (local) inertial frames in terms of
the configuration of (observable) distant masses—that is, a theory satisfying
(a version of) Mach’s Principle—would meet such a requirement.
In his quest for a relativistic theory of gravity, Einstein did not attempt
to implement (this version of) Mach’s principle directly. Instead he believed
that the equivalence principle (as he understood it) was the key to extending
the relativity principle to cover frames uniformly accelerating with respect
to the inertial frames. In standard SR, force-free bodies that move uniformly
in an inertial frame F are equally accelerated by inertial “pseudo forces”
relative to a frame F ′ that is uniformly accelerating relative to F . According
to Einstein’s equivalence principle, the physics of frame F ′ is strictly identical
to that of a “real” inertial frame in which there is a uniform gravitational field.
In other words, the same laws of physics hold in two frames that accelerate
with respect to each other. According to one frame, there is a gravitational
field; according to the other, there is not. The laws that hold with respect to
both frames, therefore, must cover gravitational physics. Einstein took it to
follow that there is no fact of the matter about whether a body is moving
uniformly or whether it is accelerating under the influence of gravitation. The
existence of a gravitational field becomes frame-relative, in a manner allegedly
analogous to the frame-relativity of particular electric and magnetic fields in
special relativity.6
The equivalence principle, then, led Einstein to believe both that rela-
tivistic laws covering gravitational phenomena would extend the relativity
principle and that the gravitational field would depend, in a frame-relative
manner, on the metric field, gab. A theory implementing a general princi-
ple of relativity would affirm the physical equivalence of frames of reference
in arbitrary relative motion. Einstein took the physical equivalence of two
frames to be captured by the fact that the equations expressing the laws of
physics take the same form with respect to each of them.7 But general covari-
ance is the property that a theory possesses if its equations retain their form
under smooth but otherwise arbitrary coordinate transformation. Einstein
noted that such coordinate transformations strictly include “those which cor-
respond to all relative motions of three-dimensional systems of co-ordinates”
6 For a recent, sympathetic discussion of this aspect of Einstein’s understanding of the
equivalence principle, see Janssen (2012).
7 Recall Einstein’s 1905 statement of the restricted principle of relativity: “The laws
by which the states of physical systems undergo change are not affected, whether these
changes of state be referred to the one or the other of two systems of co-ordinates in
uniform translatory motion” (Einstein, 1905, 41).
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(Einstein, 1916, 117). He therefore maintained that any generally covariant
theory satisfies a general postulate of relativity.8
Einstein soon modified his view. Essentially the view expressed by Fried-
man in the quotation given above—that any theory can be given a generally
covariant formulation—was put to Einstein by Kretschmann (1917).9 In his
response, Einstein conceded the basic point (Einstein, 1918). He identified
three principles as at the heart of GR: (a) the (general) principle of rela-
tivity; (b) the equivalence principle; and (c) Mach’s principle. The relativity
principle, at least as characterised in his reply to Kretschmann, was no longer
conceived of in terms of the physical equivalence of frames of reference in var-
ious types of relative motion. Instead it had simply become the claim that
the laws of nature are statements only about spatiotemporal coincidences,
from which it was alleged to be an immediate corollary that such laws “find
their natural expression” in generally covariant equations. Mach’s principle
was also given a GR-specific rendition: the claim was that the metric was
completely determined by the masses of bodies.
In another couple of years, as a result of findings by de Sitter and Klein,
Einstein was also forced to accept that his theory did not vindicate Mach’s
ideas about the origin of inertia. His official objection to the spacetime struc-
tures of Newtonian and specially relativistic theories changed accordingly,
in order to fit this new reality.10 Einstein conceded that taking Newtonian
physics at face value involves taking Newton’s Absolute Space to be “some
kind of physical reality” (Einstein, 1924, 15). That it has to be conceived
of as something real is, he says, “a fact that physicists have only come to
understand in recent years” (Einstein, 1924, 16). It is absolute, however, not
merely in the substantivalist sense that it exists absolutely. Now Einstein
placed emphasis on the fact that it is not influenced “either by the config-
uration of matter, or by anything else” (Einstein, 1924, 15). This violation
of the action–reaction principle, rather than its status as an unobservable
causal agent, came to be seen as what is objectionable about pre-relativistic
spacetime. In Einstein’s words, “it is contrary to the mode of thinking in sci-
ence to conceive of a thing (the space-time continuum) which acts itself, but
which cannot be acted upon” (Einstein, 1922, 62).11 It is clear that, while
8 “Es ist klar, daß eine Physik, welche diesem Postulat [i.e., general covariance] genügt,
dem allgemeinen Relativitätspostulat gerecht wird” (Einstein, 1916, 776).
9 Kretschmann’s position is more subtle than the headline lesson that is standardly
taken from it. In particular, he relied on a key premise, closely analogous to the central
premise of Einstein’s ‘point-coincidence’ response to his own hole argument, that the
factual content of a theory is exhausted by spatiotemporal coincidences between the
objects and processes it posits; see Norton (1993, §5.1). The assumption that the basic
objects of a theory must be well defined in the sense of differential geometry has come
to play a similar role in modern renditions of Kretschmann’s claim.
10 For more on the evolution of this aspect of Einstein’s thinking, see
Brown and Lehmkuhl (2013).
11 Similarly, Anderson writes that violation of what he calls a general principle of reci-
procity “seems to be fundamentally unreasonable and unsatisfactory” (Anderson, 1964,
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GR fails to fulfil the Machian goal of providing a reductive account of the
local inertial frames, it does not suffer from this newly identified (alleged)
defect of pre-relativistic theories. The metric structure of GR conditions the
evolution of the material content of spacetime, but it is also, in turn, affected
by that content.
This potted review of Einstein’s early pronouncements is intended to show
that he was one of the original advocates of the view outlined in Section 1,
namely, that GR differs from its predecessors, not through lacking the kind
of spacetime structures that such theories have, but by no longer treating
that structure as a non-dynamical background. It also shows that, despite
being responsible for the idea that the general covariance of GR has physical
significance as the expression of the theory’s generalisation of the relativ-
ity principle, Einstein himself quickly retreated from this idea. He continued
(mistakenly) to espouse the idea that GR generalised the principle of relativ-
ity, via the equivalence principle, but GR’s general covariance was no longer
taken to be a sufficient condition of its doing so. Instead the implication in
the opposite direction was stressed. General covariance was taken to be a
necessary condition of implementing a general relativity principle: there can
be no special coordinate systems adapted to preferred states of motion in a
theory in which there are no preferred states of motion!
In the immediate wake of Kretschmann’s criticism, one of Einstein’s most
revealing statements concerning the status of general covariance comes in
his response to a paper by Ernst Reichenbächer. There Einstein contrasts a
theory that includes an acceleration standard with one that does not:
if acceleration has absolute meaning, then the nonaccelerated coordinate systems
are preferred by nature, i.e., the laws then must—when referred to them—be
different (and simpler) than the ones referred to accelerated coordinate systems.
Then it makes no sense to complicate the formulation of the laws by pressing them
into a generally covariant form.
Vice versa, if the laws of nature are such that they do not attain a preferred
form through the choice of coordinate systems of a special state of motion, then
one cannot relinquish the condition of general covariance as a means of research.
(Einstein, 1920, 205)
From a modern perspective, several things are notable about this passage.
First, GR qualifies as a theory whose laws do not attain a “preferred form
through the choice of coordinate systems of a special state of motion,” not be-
cause (as Einstein believed) acceleration does not have an absolute meaning
in the theory, but because the structure that defines absolute acceleration is
no longer homogeneous; in general, it is not possible to define, over a neigh-
bourhood of a point in spacetime, a coordinate system whose lines of constant
spatial coordinate are both non-accelerating absolutely and not accelerating
192). As far as I know, neither he nor Einstein explain why, exactly, such violation is
supposed to be objectionable. At the very least, given Newton’s open-eyed advocacy of
absolute space, it seems peculiar to describe it as “contrary to the mode of scientific
thinking.”
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with respect to each other. GR lacks a non-generally-covariant formulation,12
but not for the reason Einstein suggests.
Second, while the equations expressing a theory’s laws might be simpler
in a coordinate system adapted to the theory’s standard of acceleration, it
does not follow that these equations, and the equations that hold with re-
spect to accelerated coordinate systems, express different laws. In fact, it
is much more natural to see the formally different equations as but differ-
ent coordinate-dependent expressions of the same relations holding between
coordinate-independent entities. As Anderson says of entities that occur ex-
plicitly in a generally covariant formulation of some laws but which were not
apparent in the non-(generally)-covariant equations: “these elements were
there in the first place, although their existence was masked by the fact
that they had been assigned particular values. That is, the gµν [of a gener-
ally covariant formulation of a special relativity] are present in [the Lorentz-
covariant form of] special relativity with the fixed preassigned values of the
Minkowski metric” (Anderson, 1964, 192).13
Finally, while calculation might not be aided by complicating the formula-
tion of the laws by expressing them generally covariantly, conceptual clarity
can be. Real structures that are only implicit in the non-covariant formalism
are laid bare in the generally-covariant formalism, and their status can then
be subjected to scrutiny.
In fact, Einstein himself says something quite consonant with these obser-
vations earlier in the same paper:
the coordinate system is only ameans of description and in itself has nothing to do
with the objects to be described. Only a law of nature in a generally covariant form
can do complete justice in this situation, because in any other way of describing,
statements about the means of description are jumbled with statements about the
object to be described. (Einstein, 1920, 203)
Einstein’s idea seems to be that coordinates should not have a function be-
yond the mere labelling of physical entities, the qualitative character of which
is to be fully described by other means. But this is a basis, not for an argument
in favour of laws that can only be expressed generally covariantly (seemingly
Einstein’s intention), but for an argument for the generally-covariant formu-
lation of laws in general, whatever they be. Ironically, it is an argument that
is most relevant to pre-relativistic theories, not GR, because only in this con-
text can one choose to encode physically meaningful quantities (spacetime
12 Even this can be disputed. Fock, for example, argued that harmonic coordinates,
defined via the condition (gµν
√−g),µ = 0, have a preferred status in GR, analogous to
that of Lorentz charts in special relativity.
13 The same view of the meaning of the preferred coordinates of the non-covariant form
of Newtonian gravitation theory is clearly articulated by Trautman (1966, 418). It was
thoroughly assimilated in the philosophical literature; see, e.g., Friedman (1983, 54–55).
The perspective is explored further in Sections 4 and 10, where I argue that its relevance
for discussions of alleged differences between the observables of GR and pre-relativistic
theories has not been fully appreciated.
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intervals) via special choices of coordinate system, and thereby ‘jumble up’
the mode of description with that described.
3 Dissent from Quantum Gravity
Let me sum up the picture presented so far. General covariance per se has no
physical content: the essence of Kretschmann’s objection to Einstein is that
any sensible theory can be formulated in a generally covariant manner. It
follows that GR does not differ from SR in virtue of having a generally covari-
ant formulation. However, GR does differ from SR in lacking a non-covariant
formulation. Some authors have made this fact the basis for claiming that
GR, but not SR, satisfies a “principle of general covariance”. For example,
Bergmann writes: “The hypothesis that the geometry of physical space is
represented best by a formalism which is covariant with respect to general
coordinate transformations, and that a restriction to a less general group of
transformations would not simplify that formalism, is called the principle of
general covariance” (Bergmann, 1942, 159).
In SR the existence of a non-covariant formulation is connected with the
failure of a general principle of relativity. The privileged coordinate systems
of SR, in which the equations expressing the laws simplify, encode (inter alia)
a standard of non-accelerated motion. There can be no preferred coordinate
systems (of such a type) in a theory that implements a general principle of
relativity. This might suggest that GR’s lack of a non-covariant formulation is
connected to the generalisation of a relativity principle, but (pace Einstein)
it stems from no such thing. Rather, the lack of preferred coordinates is
due to the fact that the spacetime structures of a generic solution, including
those structures common to SR and GR that define absolute acceleration (in
essentially the same way in both theories), lack symmetries and so cannot be
encoded in special coordinates.
Finally, this lack of symmetry is entailed by, but does not entail, the fun-
damental distinguishing feature of GR, namely, that the structure encoded
by the metric of GR is, unlike that of SR, dynamical. A fully dynamical field,
free to vary from solution to solution, will generically lack symmetries. So a
background independent theory, in which all fields are dynamical, will lack
a non-covariant formulation (of the relevant kind). The converse, however, is
not true. In principle we can define a theory involving a background metric
with no isometries, and such a theory will only have a generally covariant
formulation.14
14 Smolin demurs: “if one believes that the geometry of space is going to have an absolute
character, fixed in advance, by some a priori principles, you are going to be led to posit
a homogeneous geometry. For what, other than particular states of matter, would be
responsible for inhomogeneities in the geometry of space?” (Smolin, 2006, 201). But why
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Something like this collection of commitments, though not uncontroversial,
represents a mainstream view, at least amongst more recent textbooks in the
tradition of Synge (1960) and Misner et al. (1973). Unfortunately, there is a
fly in the ointment, for it apparently conflicts with a dominant view amongst
many in the quantum gravity community, in particular, the founding fathers
of loop quantum gravity. Workers in this field often endorse the idea that
GR’s background independence, understood as the absence of ‘fixed’, non-
dynamical spacetime structure, is its defining feature. But they go on to link
this property to the theory’s general covariance, or, to use the more favoured
label, its diffeomorphism invariance. For example, Lee Smolin claims that
“both philosophically and mathematically, it is diffeomorphism invariance
that distinguishes general relativity from other field theories” (Smolin, 2003,
234).
And Carlo Rovelli, who has perhaps written the most on the link between
background independence and diffeomorphism invariance, says of the back-
ground independence of classical GR that “technically, it is realized by the
gauge invariance of the action under (active) diffeomorphisms” (Rovelli, 2004,
10), and (perhaps in less careful moments) he treats the two as synonymous
(Gaul and Rovelli, 2000, 279).
On the face of it, these claims conflict with the Kretschmann view. They
appear to assert that a formal property of GR, its “(active) diffeomorphism in-
variance”, has physical content in virtue of realising, or expressing, a physical
property of the theory, namely, its background independence. Since specially
relativistic theories are not background independent (as we have been under-
standing this term), it should follow that they cannot be formulated in a dif-
feomorphism invariant manner. At the very least, if one follows Kretschmann
in supposing that any theory can be formulated in a generally covariant man-
ner, then (active) diffeomorphism invariance, as understood by Rovelli et al.,
cannot be the same as general covariance as understood in the Kretschmann
tradition. And, indeed, the same authors routinely draw distinctions of this
kind.
Much of the rest of this paper is concerned to see how far one can push back
against the Rovelli–Smolin line, in the spirit of Kretschmann and Friedman.
What the exercise reveals is that the connection between diffeomorphism
invariance and background independence is messier, and less illuminating,
than recent discussions originating in the quantum gravity literature might
suggest. It also sheds light on a different but closely related topic. In the
same discussions, the diffeomorphism invariance and/or background indepen-
dence of GR is frequently taken to have profound implications for the nature
of the theory’s observables. It is important that a merely technical sense of
“observable” is not all that is at issue. The claim often appears to be that
GR and pre-relativistic theories differ in terms of the kind of thing that is
observable in a non-technical sense. In other words, it is alleged that the the-
does a background geometry need to be fixed by “a priori principles”? Its being what it
is could simply be brute fact, inhomogeneities notwithstanding.
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ories differ over the fundamental nature of the physical magnitudes that they
postulate.15 This, I believe, is a mistake, as I hope some of the distinctions
to be reviewed below help to show.
The first task is to clarify what might be meant by “diffeomorphism in-
variance” as distinct from “general covariance”. I then revisit the notion of a
background field, as characterised informally above, for finer-grained distinc-
tions should be drawn here too.
4 General Covariance vs Diffeomorphism Invariance
Several authors have drawn what they presumably take to be the crucial,
bipartite distinction between types of general covariance and diffeomorphism
invariance. Norton, for example, distinguishes “active” and “passive” gen-
eral covariance (Norton, 1989, 1226, 1230). Rovelli distinguishes “active diff
invariance” from “passive diff invariance” (Rovelli, 2001, 122). Earman dis-
tinguishes merely “formal” from “substantive” general covariance (Earman,
2006b,a). Ohanian and Ruffini distinguish “general covariance” from “general
invariance” (Ohanian and Ruffini, 2013, 276–9). Finally, Giulini distinguishes
“covariance under diffeomorphisms” from “invariance under diffeomorphisms”
(Giulini, 2007, 108). As this cornucopia of terminology indicates, several dif-
ferent distinctions are in play, and linked to further ancillary notions (for
example, that between “active” and “passive” transformations) in myriad
ways. In the face of this morass, my strategy will be to articulate as clearly
as I can what I take to be the most useful distinction, before relating it to
several of the ideas just listed.
In differentiating distinct notions of general covariance and diffeomorphism
invariance, it will be useful to consider various concrete formulations of the-
ories that exemplify the properties in question. Further, when contrasting
specially and generally relativistic theories, it is good policy to eliminate un-
necessary and potentially misleading differences by choosing theories that are
as similar as possible. My running example, for both the specially and gen-
erally relativistic cases, will be theories of a relativistic massless real scalar
field, Φ.
In the context of SR, such a field obeys the Klein–Gordon equation, but
there are at least three “versions” of this equation to consider:
∂2Φ
∂x2
+
∂2Φ
∂y2
+
∂2Φ
∂z2
− ∂
2Φ
∂t2
= 0, (1)
ηµνΦ;νµ = 0, (2)
ηab∇a∇bΦ = 0. (3)
15 Amongst philosophers, Earman (2006a) and Rickles (2008) are proponents of variants
of this view.
12 O. Pooley
These equations are most plausibly understood as (elements of) different for-
mulations of one and the same theory, not as characterising different theories.
This requires that the equations are understood as but different ways of
picking out the very same set of models (and thereby the very same set of
physical possibilities). On the picture that allows this, one also gains a better
understanding of the content of each equation.
What is that picture? Start with equation (3). The roman indices occurring
in the equation are “abstract indices”, indicating the type of geometric object
involved. This equation, therefore, is not to be interpreted (as the other two
are) as relating the coordinate components of various objects. Rather, it is a
direct description of (the relations holding between) certain geometric object
fields defined on a differentiable manifold. Its models are triples of the form
〈M,ηab, Φ〉: differential manifolds equipped with a (flat) Lorentzian metric
field ηab and a single scalar field Φ. (I am taking the torsion-free, metric-
compatible derivative operator, ∇, to be defined in terms of the metric field;
it is not another primitive object, over and above ηab and Φ.)
Equations (1) and (2) are to be understood as ways of characterising the
very same models, but now given under certain types of coordinate descrip-
tion. In particular, in the case of equation (1), one is choosing coordinates
that are specially adapted to symmetries of one of the fields of the model,
namely, the flat Minkowski metric. Such coordinates are singled out via the
“coordinate condition” ηµν = diag(−1, 1, 1, 1). In the case of equation (2), one
is allowing any coordinate system adapted to the differential structure of the
manifold, M .
We are now in a position to draw the crucial distinction between general
covariance (as it has been implicitly understood in the previous sections) and
diffeomorphism invariance for, on one natural way of further filling in the
details, although it is generally covariant, the theory just given fails to be
diffeomorphism invariant.
First, general covariance. We define this as follows:
General Covariance. A formulation of a theory is generally covariant iff
the equations expressing its laws are written in a form that holds with respect
to all members of a set of coordinate systems that are related by smooth but
otherwise arbitrary transformations.
It is clear that such a formulation is possible for our theory. It is what
is achieved in the passage from the traditional form of the equation, (1), to
equation (2). General covariance in this sense is sometimes taken to be equiva-
lent to the claim that the laws have a coordinate-free formulation (Friedman,
1983, 54; Giulini, 2007, 108). This takes us to equation (3): if the laws re-
late geometric objects of types that are intrinsically characterisable, without
recourse to how their components transformations under changes of coordi-
nates, then one should be able, with the introduction of the right notation,
to describe the relationships between them directly, rather than in terms of
relationships that hold between the objects’ coordinate components.
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In order to address the question of the theory’s diffeomorphism invariance,
one needs to be more explicit than we have so far been about how one should
understand equation (3). In particular, what, exactly, is the referent of the
‘ηab’ that occurs in this equation? Here is one very natural way to set things
up. It is a picture that lies behind the claim of several authors that, while
specially relativistic theories can be made generally covariant in the sense
just described, they are nevertheless not diffeomorphism invariant.
Take the kinematically possible models (KPMs) of the theory to be suitably
smooth functions from some given manifold equipped with a Minkowski met-
ric, 〈M,ηab〉 into R. That is, they are objects of the form 〈M,ηab, Φ〉, where
ηab is held fixed—it is identically the same in every model.
16 The dynamically
possible models (DPMs) are then the proper subset of these objects picked
out by the requirement that Φ satisfies the Klein–Gordon equation relative
to the ηab common to all the KPMs. So understood, equation (3) is not an
equation for ηab and Φ together. Rather, it is an equation for Φ alone, given
ηab (cf. Giulini, 2007, 107). For ease of future reference, call this version of
the specially relativistic theory of the scalar field SR1.
Our initial definition of diffeomorphism invariance runs as follows:
Diffeomorphism Invariance (version 1). A theory T is diffeomorphism
invariant iff, if 〈M,O1, O2, . . .〉 is a solution of T , then so is 〈M,d∗O1, d∗O2, . . .〉
for all d ∈ Diff(M).17
So defined, diffeomorphism invariance corresponds to what has sometimes
simply been identified as general covariance in the post-Hole Argument philo-
sophical literature.18 Friedman is explicit in taking general covariance as
defined above (cf. Friedman, 1983, 51) to be equivalent to diffeomorphism
invariance as just defined (cf. Friedman, 1983, 58). In arguing for this equiv-
alence (Friedman, 1983, 52–4), he appears to overlook the crucial possibility,
exploited here, that a coordinate-free equation relating two geometric objects
A and B, can nonetheless be interpreted as an equation for B alone, given a
fixed A. (We shall see in Section 9 that Earman (2006b) seems to be guilty
of a similar oversight.)
16 This means that the concept of a fixed field is not equivalent to the concept of an
absolute object in the Anderson–Friedman sense. In using “fixed” in this quasi-technical
sense, I follow Belot (see, e.g., 2007, 197, fn 137). The distinction is explored more fully
in Section 7.
17 In this statement of the condition, Oi and d∗Oi are distinct mathematical objects;
one is not contrasting different coordinate representations of the very same objects.
18 See, e.g., Earman (1989, 47). As mentioned, Norton distinguishes active and passive
general covariance. His statement of the former (Norton, 1989, 1226) is almost identical
to the statement of diffeomorphism invariance just given, save that he considers dif-
feomorphisms between distinct manifolds. (His statement of passive general covariance
(Norton, 1989, 1230) differs, however, from the characterisation of general covariance
given above, in focusing on the closure properties of the set of coordinate representa-
tions of a theory’s models, rather than on the nature of the equations that pick out such
models.)
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Returning to SR1, it is clear that, with the KPMs and DPMs defined
as suggested, the theory does not satisfy the definition of diffeomorphism
invariance just given. If 〈M,ηab, Φ〉 is a model of the theory, 〈M,d∗ηab, d∗Φ〉
will be a model only if d∗ηab = ηab, for only in that case will 〈M,d∗ηab, d∗Φ〉
correspond to a KPM, let alone a DPM!
Contrast SR1 to the generally relativistic theory of the scalar field. To
make the analogy as close as possible, consider the sector of the theory de-
fined on the same manifold M mentioned in SR1. Call this theory GR1.
Superficially, the KPMs and the DPMs of GR1 are the same type of objects
as those of SR1: triples of the form 〈M, gab, Φ〉, where gab, like ηab, is a
Lorentzian metric field. But now one does not have the option of taking gab
to be fixed.19 Rather the KPMs of the theory are all possible triples of the
form 〈M, gab, Φ〉, subject only to gab and Φ satisfying suitable differentiability
(and perhaps boundary) conditions. The DPMs are picked out as a proper
subset of the KPMs by two equations:
gab∇a∇bΦ = 0, (4)
Gab = 8piTab. (5)
Equation (5) is the Einstein field equation, relating the Einstein tensorGab,
encoding certain curvature properties of gab, to the energy momentum tensor
Tab.
20 Equation (4) might look superficially like equation (3), but now it is no
longer an equation for Φ given gab. Rather (4) and (5) together form a coupled
system of equations—the “Einstein–Klein–Gordon equations”—for gab and
Φ together. This generally relativistic theory is, of course, diffeomorphism
invariant: if 〈M, gab, Φ〉 satisfies equations (4) and (5), so does 〈M,d∗gab, d∗Φ〉
for any diffeomorphism d.
The rather dramatic way in which SR1 fails to meet our definition of diffeo-
morphism invariance—that for a generic diffeomorphism d, 〈M,d∗ηab, d∗Φ〉 is
not even a KPM when 〈M,ηab, Φ〉 is a DPM—suggests a modification of our
definition. Rather than considering the effect of a diffeomorphism on all of the
fields of a theory’s models, we can exploit the distinction, built into the very
construction of the theory, between fixed fields and dynamical fields. Letting
F stand for the solution-independent fixed fields common to all KPMs, and
letting D stand for the dynamical fields, we can consider the effect of acting
only on the latter. This leads to the following amended definition:
19 Strictly speaking, one could interpret equations (4) and (5), given below, as describing
a theory of a single field Φ propagating on a fixed gab. The resulting space of DPMs
would consist of a single point in this cut-down space of KPMs! What, exactly, would
be wrong with such a setup? We take ourselves to have evidence for the (approximate)
truth of our theory (GR) even though we have not pinned down a specific model. But
on this variant of the theory, pinning down the theory requires pinning down a unique
model.
20 For our massless real scalar field, Tab = (∇aΦ)(∇bΦ)− 12gabgmn(∇mΦ)(∇nΦ).
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Diffeomorphism Invariance (final version). A theory T is diffeomor-
phism invariant iff, if 〈M,F,D〉 is a solution of T , then so is 〈M,F, d∗D〉 for
all d ∈ Diff(M).
More generally, one can say that a theory T is G-invariant, for some subgroup
G ⊆ Diff(M) iff, if 〈M,F,D〉 is a solution of T , then so is 〈M,F, g∗D . . .〉 for
all g ∈ G.
SinceGR1 involves no fixed fields, acting only on the dynamical fields just
is to act on all the fields. Our amendment to the definition of diffeomorphism
invariance therefore makes no material difference in this case. For this reason,
focus on theories like GR1 tends to obscure the difference between our two
definitions. Turning to the case of SR1, this theory still fails to be diffeomor-
phism invariant under the new definition: for an arbitrary diffeomorphism d,
if 〈M,ηab, Φ〉 is a solution of SR1, then 〈M,ηab, d∗Φ〉, in general, will not be.
However, assuming no boundary conditions are being imposed, 〈M,ηab, d∗Φ〉
will nonetheless be a KPM of the theory. This becomes significant when con-
sidering the definition of the invariance of the theory under proper subgroups
of Diff(M).
Suppose T has models of the form 〈M,F,D〉 and that d is a symmetry of
the fixed, background structure, i.e., d∗F = F . In this case, 〈M,d∗F, d∗D〉 =
〈M,F, d∗D〉 and so, for this subgroup of Diff(M), an invariance principle that
asks us to consider transformations of all fields, background and dynamical,
will give the same verdict as those that consider transformations only of the
dynamical fields. Further, it follows from the general covariance of the theory,
i.e., from the fact that its defining equation can be give a coordinate-free
expression, that when d is a symmetry of F , 〈M,d∗F, d∗D〉 = 〈M,F, d∗D〉
will be a DPM whenever 〈M,F,D〉 is.21 We can therefore define G-invariance
either by analogy with the first definition of diffeomorphism invariance or (as
advocated) by analogy with the final version, and we will get the verdict
that if G is a subgroup of the automorphism group of F , then the theory is
G-invariant.
The definitions give different verdicts, however, when we consider the op-
posite implication: if T is a G-invariant theory, does it follow that G is a
subgroup of the automorphism group of its fixed fields F? If G-invariance re-
quires that if 〈M,F,D〉 is a DPM then so is 〈M, g∗F, g∗D . . .〉, for all g ∈ G,
then no diffeomorphism that is not also an automorphism of F could be a
member of G. Such a diffeomorphism does not map KPMs to KPMs. How-
ever, if G-invariance only requires that if 〈M,F,D〉 is a DPM then so is
〈M,F, g∗D . . .〉, then the automorphisms of F can be a proper subgroup of G.
In fact, this is exactly the situation in the case of SR1. Let d correspond to a
conformal transformation of ηab. Since we are considering the massless Klein–
21 Note that this claim is not identical to Earman’s claim that it follows from general
covariance that a diffeomorphism that is symmetry of a theory’s spacetime structure
will also be what he calls a “dynamical symmetry” (Earman, 1989, 46–7). The reason
is that Earman’s “general covariance” corresponds to the (unmodified) definition of
diffeomorphism invariance given above.
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Gordon field, if 〈M,ηab, Φ〉 is a DPM, then so is 〈M,ηab, d∗Φ〉, even though
d∗ηab 6= ηab. We can only capture this fact in terms of the statement that
the theory is invariant under the relevant group if we define such invariance
in the modified manner.22
Let’s take a step back and recall the wider project. We are interested
in assessing the claim that diffeomorphism invariance is intimately linked to
background independence. I contend that the distinction drawn in this section
between general covariance and diffeomorphism invariance, and exemplified
by SR1’s satisfaction of the first but not the second, is the right one for this
purpose, for it makes good sense of several remarks by the claim’s defenders.
For example, Smolin (2003, §6) offers an extended discussion of diffeomor-
phism invariance and its connection to background independence. His focus
is on the interpretational consequences of diffeomorphism invariance, rather
than on providing a positive characterisation of the property as such, so no
direct comparison with the definition proposed here can be made. (He is
also particularly concerned to stress the gauge status of diffeomorphisms in
the context of a diffeomorphism-invariant formulation of a theory, a topic I
return to in Section 9.) However, his contrasting diffeomorphism invariance
with general coordinate invariance is fully consonant with the distinction of
this section:
it can be asserted—indeed it is true—that with the introduction of explicit back-
ground fields any field theory can be written in a way that is generally coordinate
invariant. This is not true of diffeomorphisms [sic] invariance, which relies on
the fact that in general relativity there are no non-dynamical background fields.
(Smolin, 2003, 233)
It is natural to read the second half of this passage as committing Smolin to
the claim that SR1 cannot be made diffeomorphism invariant because the
theory involves a non-dynamical background, ηab.
Consider, now, a revealing passage from Rovelli. Having summarised what
he takes to be the philosophical implications of GR’s lack of non-dynamical
background structures, he states that these implications are “coded in the
active diffeomorphism invariance (diff invariance) of GR” (Rovelli, 2001, 108).
He goes on to elaborate in a footnote:
Active diff invariance should not be confused with passive diff invariance, or in-
variance under change of co-ordinates. . . A field theory is formulated in [a] manner
invariant under passive diffs (or change of co-ordinates), if we can change the co-
ordinates of the manifold, re-express all the geometric quantities (dynamical and
non-dynamical) in the new coordinates, and the form of the equations of motion
22 Similar, historically-inspired examples are Galilean-invariant classical mechanics set
in full Newtonian spacetime and, more interestingly, Newtonian gravitational theory set
in Galilean spacetime (see, e.g., Knox, 2014). What these examples should remind one
is that such theories are epistemologically problematic. The background structure that
they postulate introduces allegedly meaningful properties (e.g., absolute velocities) that
are undetectable in principle. This motivates the search for formulations with weaker
background structure (see, e.g. Pooley, 2013, §3 and §6).
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does not change. A theory is invariant under active diffs, when a smooth displace-
ment of the dynamical fields (the dynamical fields alone) over the manifold, sends
solutions of the equations of motion into solutions of the equations of motion.
(Rovelli, 2001, 122)
I take it that SR1 is precisely a theory formulated in a manner invariant un-
der passive diffs, but not active diffs, whereasGR1 is a theory invariant under
active diffs. In other words, Rovelli’s “passive diffeomorphism invariance” is
what I called above general covariance. Identifying Rovelli’s “non-dynamical”
fields with fixed fields, his “active diffeomorphism invariance” corresponds to
our (amended) definition of diffeomorphism invariance.
Finally, Giulini (2007) offers equivalent definitions, although he adopts a
rather different approach to characterising general covariance. He schemati-
cally represents a theory’s equations of motion as:
F [γ, Φ,Σ] = 0 (6)
Here γ goes proxy for structures given by maps into the manifold M (repre-
senting particle worldlines, strings etc.) and Φ goes proxy for the dynamical
fields: maps from spacetime into some value space (or, more generally, struc-
tures given by sections in some bundle over M). Finally, Σ stands for the
fixed (“background”) structures.23
He then distinguishes what he calls the notion of covariance from invari-
ance as follows (see Giulini, 2007, 108). Equation (6) is said to be covariant
under diffeomorphisms iff:
F [γ, Φ,Σ] = 0 iff F [d · γ, d · Φ, d ·Σ] = 0 ∀d ∈ Diff(M). (7)
It is invariant under diffeomorphisms iff:
F [γ, Φ,Σ] = 0 iff F [d · γ, d · Φ,Σ] = 0 ∀d ∈ Diff(M). (8)
The only difference between these conditions is that in the former but not
in the latter case one allows the diffeomorphism to act on the fixed fields.
In absence of fixed fields, therefore, the distinction between the conditions
collapses: covariance implies invariance.
The distinction between the γ and Φ, on the one hand, and the Σ on
the other is crucial in understanding these conditions. Consider, first, condi-
tion (8). The statement that F [γ, Φ,Σ] = 0 iff F [d · γ, d · Φ,Σ] = 0 simply
means that 〈γ, Φ〉 and 〈d·γ, d·Φ〉 stand or fall together as solutions of (6). The
condition is therefore this section’s (modified) statement of diffeomorphism
invariance.
Now consider condition (7). The fact that F [γ, Φ,Σ] = 0 is only an equa-
tion for γ and Φ (but notΣ) means that F [γ, Φ,Σ] = 0 and F [d·γ, d·Φ, d·Σ] =
23 In both our examples theories, γ is empty and the scalar field Φ belongs to Giulini’s
category Φ. In the case of SR1, ηab belongs to Σ; in GR1, gab belongs to (Giulini’s) Φ,
and Σ is empty.
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0 are distinct equations. The condition states that if 〈γ, Φ〉 is a solution to (6),
then 〈d·γ, d·Φ〉 must be a solution of a structurally similar equation involving
the different field(s) d · Σ. The condition (7), therefore, says nothing about
whether d maps a solution of (6) to another solution of the same equation.
Given that Σ represents fixed fields, (7) does not collapse into our original,
unmodified statement of diffeomorphism invariance. All that it requires is
that (6) be well defined in the differential-geometric sense. It is therefore
equivalent to the requirement that the equation have a generally covariant
expression in the sense given earlier.
5 Diffeomorphism-Invariant Special Relativity
The previous section described a generally-covariant but non-diffeomorphism-
invariant formulation of an intuitively background-dependent theory, SR1.
This was contrasted with a generally-covariant and diffeomorphism-invariant
formulation of an intuitively background-independent theory, GR1.24 What
should one make of SR1’s failure to be diffeomorphism invariant? Does it
support Smolin’s contention that diffeomorphism invariance “relies on” the
absence of background fields? In this section and the next, I suggest that it
does not. At the very least, whether it does depends on what counts as a
“background field.”
We need to consider yet another formulation of a theory, which I’ll call
SR2. This theory’s space of KPMs is the very same set of objects that formed
the space of KPMs of the generally-relativistic GR1. But, rather than being
picked out via equations (4) and (5), the subspace of DPMs is defined via:
gab∇a∇bΦ = 0, (4)
Rabcd = 0, (9)
where Rabcd is the Riemann curvature tensor of gab.
25 Several comments are
in order before we assess the interpretational dilemmas that SR2 presents.
First, the contrast between SR1 and SR2 highlights something of a con-
trast between the philosophy literature, including the post-Hole Argument
literature, and discussions of background independence arising from attempts
to quantise GR. Crudely put, philosophers have tended to have a formulation
24 From here on, when I refer simply to “diffeomorphism invariance” I am referring to
the property captured by the second (final) definition given in the previous section. The
merits, or otherwise, of the first definition will not be discussed further.
25 As with those of GR1, the theory’s KPMs are restricted to fields defined on a given
manifold M . In the previous section, this restriction served to allow as direct as possible
a comparison between GR1 and SR1. When comparison with SR1 is not at issue, the
restriction is arbitrary. One can (and should) generalise the formulations of SR2 and
GR1 further, not least to allow for different global topologies.
Background Independence 19
of a theory like SR2 in mind when they have considered ‘generally covariant’
formulations of special relativity (see, e.g., Earman and Norton, 1987, 518),
whereas physicists have tended to have something like SR1 in mind. This
is not unrelated to the fact, noted in the previous section, that Friedman,
Earman, and even Norton (used to) identify (active) general covariance with
diffeomorphism invariance (as initially characterised in the previous section).
This is not to say that the physics literature has not discussed theories
like SR2—we shall shortly see that it has—but it is possible to mistake a
discussion of an SR1-type theory for that of a SR2-type theory. One does not
arrive at SR2 simply by stipulating that equation (9) is to be satisfied. One
must also indicate how gab, as it occurs in (4) and (9), is to be interpreted.
After all, the field ηab of SR1 satisfies a formally identical equation to (9).
It is just that, in this context, the equation does not function to pick out a
class of DPMs from a wider class of KPMs. Instead it characterises a fixed
field common to all the KPMs. In SR2, it is important that (4) and (9), just
like (4) and (5) in GR1, are understood as coupled equations for both Φ and
gab.
Finally, of course, we should note the crucial fact that SR2, like GR1 and
unlike SR1, is diffeomorphism invariant.
6 Connecting Diffeomorphism Invariance and
Background Independence
What does the the diffeomorphism invariance of SR2 tell us about the al-
leged link between diffeomorphism invariance and background independence?
A proper answer to this question will require disentangling various meanings
of “background”, but here is the obvious moral: SR2 is a diffeomorphism-
invariant but intuitively background-dependent theory. Diffeomorphism in-
variance therefore cannot be equated with—or be seen as a formal expression
of, or sufficient condition for—background independence. Diffeomorphism in-
variance is not, per se, what differentiates GR from pre-relativistic theories.
Here is one way that this conclusion might be resisted. Consider the follow-
ing questions. (Q1) Is SR2 a background-independent theory? (Q2) Are SR1
and SR2 merely different ways of formulating the same theory? Suppose that
one answers (Q1) in the affirmative, on the grounds that gab in a model of
the theory is a solution to an equation. It therefore counts as a ‘dynamical
field’; it is not ‘fixed a priori’. This, in effect, is to treat ‘background field’ as
synonymous with ‘solution-independent fixed field’ in the sense highlighted
in Section 4. One then goes on to answer question (Q2) in the negative. Pre-
cursors of GR were not background independent, period, and so only SR1
is faithful to the pre-GR understanding of the spacetime structure of special
relativity.
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I take it that this package is a highly implausible cocktail of views. First,
one should ask: on what basis can one assert that SR1 and SR2 constitute
genuinely distinct theories, rather than merely different formulations of the
same theory? On the face of it, since their models involve the same types
of geometric object, and since all objects in any solution of one theory are
diffeomorphic to the corresponding objects in some solution of the other,
the two formulations appear to be, not merely empirically equivalent, but
equivalent in a thoroughgoing sense. The DPMs of one theory are isomorphic
to the DPMs of the other; it is just that, for each solution of one of the
theories, the other theory has an infinite set of diffeomorphic copies.
Second, the classification of SR2 as relevantly similar to GR1, and so
background independent, focuses on a minor similarity between the theories
at the expense of a more significant contrast. True, the gabs of both theories
are treated as ‘solutions of equations’ and in this sense they are not fixed, but
this fact seems much less interesting than their obvious differences. Recall the
intuitive characterisation of the differences between the spacetime structures
of GR and pre-relativistic theories given in Section 1: in GR, the curvature
of spacetime varies, not just in time and space, but across models, and the
material content of spacetime influences how it does so. The fact that the
gab of SR2 is the solution of an equation is not a sufficient condition for
either of these features. The gab of SR2 is not affected by matter, because
it is wholly determined (up to isomorphism) by equation (9). Relatedly, in
the sense that matters, the metric structure of spacetime does not differ from
DPM to DPM: the gabs in any two DPMs are isomorphic to one another.
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These features of SR2 mean that, if one wishes to remain faithful to
the natural pre-theoretic sense of “background”, it should be classified as a
background-dependent theory. They further suggest that one should regard
SR1 and the diffeomorphism-invariant SR2 as different formulations of the
same, background-dependent theory. In contrast, GR1 is (a diffeomorphism-
invariant formulation of) a background-independent theory. This situation
might bring to mind Bergmann’s claim, noted in Section 3, that the distinc-
tive feature of GR is its lack of a non-generally-covariant formulation. This
feature of GR could not be equated with its background independence: a
background-dependent theory might lack a non-generally-covariant formula-
tion because its background structures lack symmetries. However, now we
have the distinction between general covariance and diffeomorphism invari-
ance on the table, the general approach might appear more promising.
The idea is that it is the lack of a non-diffeomorphism-invariant formu-
lation, rather than the existence of a diffeomorphism-invariant formulation,
that is the mark of a background-independent theory. A non-diffeomorphism-
invariant formulation of a theory requires that some elements of its models
are regarded as fixed, identically the same from model to model. If a theory
is background dependent, in the sense that it involves non-dynamical fields
26 Strictly, the global topology of the manifold M might allow for infinitely many non-
isomorphic flat metric fields. Even so, these will all be locally isomorphic.
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that (intuitively) do not vary from model to model, then those fields can be
represented by fixed structures in a non-diffeomorphism-invariant formula-
tion of the theory. But if the theory is background independent, in the sense
that all of its fields can vary from model to model, it lacks elements that can
be represented by fixed structures. Of necessity, it will be diffeomorphism
invariant.27 The background fields of a theory are to be identified with those
fields that appear as fixed elements in some non-diffeomorphism-invariant
formulation that theory. So, for example, the metric field, gab, of SR2 repre-
sents background structure because it represents the same structure that is
represented in the alternative formulation of the theory, SR1, by ηab.
There is clearly a close connection between identifying a background field
in this way and Anderson’s notion of an absolute object (Anderson, 1964,
1967). I will return to this connection at the end of the next section, after
reviewing one more complication.
7 Absolute Objects and the Action–Reaction Principle
Assume that background-independent theories can only be formulated in a
diffeomorphism invariant manner. That leaves open the issue of whether every
theory that must be formulated in a diffeomorphism-invariant manner lacks
background fields. Whether one endorses this further claim in part depends
on a subtlety concerning what it takes to be a background field.
When the metric field of GR is presented as an example of field that, unlike
its precusors in pre-relativistic theories, is not a background field, two of its
features are often run together: (i) like other fields in the theory, the metric
is dynamical; (ii) it also obeys the action–reaction principle: it is affected
by every field whose evolution it constrains. The second feature entails the
first (assuming the entity in question is not entirely dynamically redundant);
a field obviously cannot be dynamically affected and yet not be dynamical.
However, the converse implication does not hold. A field might affect without
being affected and yet have non-trivial dynamics of its own.
Consider, for example, the theory (call it GR2) given by the following
equations:
gab∇a∇bΦ = 0, (4)
Rab = 0. (10)
27 This proposal fits with some of the more careful claims from the quantum gravity
community concerning the link between background independence and diffeomorphism
invariance. For example, in an informal website article on the meaning of background
independence, Baez claims: “making the metric dynamical instead of a background struc-
ture leads to the fact that all diffeomorphisms are gauge symmetries in general relativity”
(Baez, 2000).
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Here Rab is the Ricci tensor associated with gab. In other words, equation (10)
is the the vacuum Einstein equation, even though the theory’s models contain
a material scalar field. In this theory the metric is clearly dynamical; it varies
from DPM to DPM. Since it is constrained to obey equation (4), the matter
field ‘feels’ the metric. However, in contrast to the situation in GR, matter
does not act back on the metric. The action–reaction principle is violated. To
adapt Einstein’s terminology, as quoted in Section 2, the metric of GR2 is
a causal absolute even though it is a thoroughly dynamical field.
Should gab count as a background field in this theory? One might naturally
characterise the metric as a background relative to the dynamics of Φ. It
is a kind of “dynamical background field”. But it does not seem correct to
classify the theory as a whole as background dependent on this account. After
all, in those models where Φ vanishes, the theory just is vacuum GR. This
verdict matches that reached if one sticks with the criterion proposed in the
previous section (necessary diffeomorphism invariance), forGR2 lacks a non-
diffeomorphism-invariant formulation in just the way GR1 does.
GR2 serves another illustrative purpose. At the end of the previous sec-
tion I suggested that there is a link between whether a field can appear as
a fixed field in a non-diffeomorphism-invariant formulation of a theory and
whether that field is an absolute object in Anderson’s sense. Although Ander-
son informally introduces absolute objects in terms of their violation of the
action–reaction principle, the definition he goes on to give characterises them
in terms of a notion of sameness in all DPMs of the theory.28 What the metric
field gab of GR2 illustrates is that a field can be an action–reaction violating
causal absolute without being an absolute object in the Andersonian sense.
Let us return to the connection between absolute objects and fixed fields.
How, exactly, are they related? The answer is not entirely straightforward,
partly because different authors define absolute objects slightly differently.
Anderson’s formal definition of absolute objects does not characterise them
directly. Instead he defines them in terms of conditions intended to determine
when a subset of the dynamical variables of a theory constitute the compo-
nents of the theory’s absolute objects (Anderson, 1967, 83). Friedman (1983,
56–60) later advocated a coordinate-free characterisation, according to which
a geometric object field counts as absolute if there exist the right kind of maps
between any two models of the theory that preserve the object in question
(more details shortly). According to Friedman’s set-up, the metric fields of
both SR1 and SR2 count as absolute objects, even though the metric is a
fixed field only in SR1.29 This is not true according to Anderson’s definitions.
28 The values of the absolute objects are said to determine the values non-absolute
objects but not vice versa (Anderson, 1967, 83; see also Anderson and Gautreau, 1969,
1658, fn 6). In Anderson (1964, 192), he says that “an absolute element in a theory
indicates a lack of reciprocity.” This is consistent with absolute objects being sufficient,
but not necessary, for a violation of the action–reaction principle.
29 Effectively, we are distinguishing two senses of “dynamical”. The metric of SR2 counts
as dynamical in a liberal sense, because it varies non-trivially in the space of KPMs and
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On his way of setting things up, in a non-covariant coordinate presentation
of SR1, there are no absolute elements, because the metric field is not explic-
itly represented (cf. Anderson, 1967, 87). In this formulation of the theory,
all of the variables required to characterise a solution (in this case, the values
of Φ relative to some inertial coordinate system) are the components of a
genuinely dynamical object. Nevertheless, it is clear that the metric of SR2
counts as an absolute object according to Anderson’s definition. I suggested
above that one should regard SR1 and SR2 as different formulations of the
same theory, and thus regard their metric fields as representing the same el-
ement of physical reality. Generalising this move, one can say that an object
that features as a fixed field in one formulation of a theory will appear as
an absolute object in reformulations of the theory in which that object is no
longer treated as fixed.
So far we have noted that fields that are (or can be represented as) fixed
are (or can be represented as) absolute objects. What about the converse?
If a diffeomorphism-invariant theory contains an absolute object, can it be
given a non-diffeomorphism-invariant formulation in which that object fea-
tures as a fixed field? Here, again, the way Friedman and Anderson define
“absolute object” makes a difference. While both, in different ways, formalise
a notion of “sameness in every model”, Anderson’s notion of sameness is
global whereas Friedman’s is local. More specifically, Friedman holds that,
if the models of a theory take the form 〈M,O1, . . . , On〉, then object Oi is
an absolute object just if, for any two models M1 = 〈M,O1, . . . , On〉 and
M2 = 〈M,O′1, . . . , O′n〉, and for every p ∈ M , there are neighbourhoods A
and B of p, and a diffeomorphism h : A→ B such that O′i = h∗Oi on A ∩B.
Friedman’s absolute objects can therefore possess “global degrees of freedom”:
differences between such objects might distinguish between classes of DPMs
even though the objects are (in the sense just characterised) everywhere lo-
cally indistinguishable.30 The upshot is that a theory that involves absolute
objects in Friedman’s sense may not have a (natural) non-diffeomorphism-
invariant formulation in terms of fixed fields.
A popular move is to equate background fields and absolute objects, and
so to treat background independence as the lack of absolute objects. Giulini
(2007) offers a careful recent development of this strategy. As Giulini notes,
and as is discussed in depth by Pitts (2006), several “counterexamples” sug-
gest that neither Anderson’s proposal nor Friedman’s get things just right.
The counterexamples come in three categories. (1) There are cases where
is constrained to be what it is in any DPM via the “equation of motion” (9). But in a
stricter sense it is not dynamical, because (up to a diffeomorphism) it is the same in
every model of the theory. The stricter sense takes “dynamical” to mean “not absolute”;
the liberal sense takes “dynamical” to mean “not fixed”.
30 Consider, for example, flat Lorentzian metrics on a manifold with non-trivial global
topology. Such metrics need not be globally isometric even though they are everywhere
flat. Some models might be temporally finite whereas others are temporally infinite but
spatially finite in a preferred spatial direction.
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structure that, intuitively, should count as background is not classified as
an absolute. (2) There are cases where structure that, intuitively, should not
count as background is classified as an absolute. Finally, (3), it is noted that,
on Anderson’s definition (suitably localised), GR itself turns out to have an
absolute object (and so should count as background-dependent).
Torretti’s (1984) example of a theory set in classical spacetimes of arbi-
trary but constant spatial curvature is of type (1). Pitts observes that if one
decomposes the spatial metric into a conformal spatial metric density and a
scalar density, then the former is an absolute object while the latter, while
constant in space and time, counts as a genuine, global degree of freedom.
The best-known case of type (2) is the Jones–Geroch example of the “dust”
4-velocity in GR coupled to matter that is characterised by only a 4-velocity
field and a mass density. Pitts sees both Friedman’s own suggestion—that one
take the 4-momentum field of the dust as primitive (Friedman, 1983, 59)—
and the option of defining the “4-velocity” so that it vanishes in matter-free
regions, as motivated by an Andersonian ban on formulations of a theory that
contain physically redundant variables (Pitts, 2006, 361–2).31 My own view is
that both of these “solutions” miss the central problem posed by the example.
In the context of this theory, the non-vanishing velocity field is, intuitively, as
dynamical as the the 4-momentum. The trouble arises not because we mistook
as indispensable an object that Anderson’s definition correctly classifies as
absolute. The trouble is that Anderson’s definition, intuitively, misclassifies
that object.
The example suggests that the notion of absolute objects might not, in
fact, be a better candidate than the notion of fixed fields for articulating
the sense of “dynamical” relevant to characterising background structure.
Consider, for example, a diffeomorphism-invariant formulation of a theory
set in Minkowski spacetime and involving matter characterised, in part, by
a (non-vanishing) four-velocity. One can define two distinct proper subsets
of the KPMs (and, correspondingly, the DPMs) of this theory. The first is
obtained by specialising to a particular metric field on the manifold, and
retaining all and only those KPMs (and DPMs) that include this metric field.
The second is obtained by specialising to a particular representation of the
four-velocity. If we view each set of models as determining some theory, then
both theories involve (in some sense) a fixed field. However, in the case of
the theory obtained by specialising to a particular metric, the solution set
is identifiable, as a subspace of the KPMs, via some differential equations
for the truly dynamical objects given the fixed field (the metric). In the
case of the “theory” with the fixed velocity field, in contrast, it seems highly
doubtful that we will be able to view the particular (flat) metrics occurring
in the DPMs as all and only the solutions of an equation for the metric given
the velocity field. (Imagine specialising to coordinates in which the velocity
field takes the value (1, 0, 0, 0) and consider how likely it is that the set of
31 Pitts pursues the topic further in Pitts (2009).
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admissible components of the metric field in such coordinates are picked out
via an equation.)
A similar strategy might be pursued in the case of (3). The candidate
absolute object in question is the determinant of the metric,
√−g. One might
accept this verdict without accepting that this automatically means that GR
should count as background dependent. The latter might be held to further
require that
√−g be interpretable as a fixed field.32
Suppose, however, that one sticks with the proposal that the lack of abso-
lute objects is equivalent to background independence. What light does that
shed on the relationship between background independence and diffeomor-
phism invariance? Does a theory lack a non-diffeomorphism-invariant formu-
lation just if it lacks absolute objects? We have seen that, not only are fixed
fields not absolute objects (on either Anderson’s definition or Friedman’s),
but being representable in terms of a fixed field is also not equivalent to being
an absolute object. Since the presence of fixed fields would seem to be neces-
sary for the failure of diffeomorphism invariance, this means that necessary
diffeomorphism invariance cannot be equivalent to background independence
understood as lack of absolute objects.
There is a rather desperate way to reconnect the question of whether
Diff(M) is a symmetry group with background independence: redefine sym-
metry! For example, one might try stipulating that Diff(M) is a symmetry∗
group of a theory T iff, if 〈M,A,D〉 is a model of T , then so is 〈M,A, d∗D〉 for
all d ∈ Diff(M). (Formally this looks just the definition of diffeomorphism
invariance from Section 4, with “F”, for “fixed field” replaced by “A”, for
“absolute object”.) The proposal is problematic, on at least three grounds.
First, the notion of symmetry∗ is transparently ad hoc. When our theory
contained fixed fields, restricting the action of Diff(M) to the dynamical (i.e.,
non-fixed) fields was natural. Only by doing so could one define a natural
group action on the space of KPMs. The symmetry group is then naturally
defined to be the subgroup of this group that fixes the space of DPMs. When
one has a diffeomorphism-invariant theory that includes absolute objects,
one (obviously!) does not need to stipulate that Diff(M) acts only on the
dynamical (i.e. non-absolute) fields in order for its action on the space of
KPMs to be well defined.
Second, defining the action of Diff(M) on the space of KPMs in such a
way that it does not act on the As breaks the natural definition of symmetry.
The definition yields, as intended, that a theory with, say, a flat Lorentzian
metric as its absolute object will fail to have Diff(M) as a symmetry∗ group.
But it will also fail to have the Poincaré group as a symmetry∗ group. For
any given solution 〈M,A,D〉, the maximal group G such that, for all g ∈
G, 〈M,A, g∗D〉 is a solution, will be isomorphic to the Poincaré group (or,
32 Can the the equations of the theory be interpreted as equations for the other variables
given fixed
√−g? This seems to be the correct verdict for unimodular GR, but not (or
not clearly so) for GR itself. For further discussion of this case, although not in terms
of the notion of fixed fields, see Earman (2003); Pitts (2006); Sus (2008, 2010).
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possibly, a supergroup of the Poincaré group). But for two arbitrary solutions
〈M,A,D〉 and 〈M,A′, D′〉, the groups so defined need not coincide. In fact,
in general, they will coincide only when A = A′.33
Suppose one circumvents these problems by adding some epicycles to the
definition of symmetry∗. There remains a third reason to be dissatisfied with
the proposal that background independence is equivalent to Diff(M)’s being
a symmetry∗ group. At bottom, what is doing all the work is the notion of
absolute object, in terms of which the gerrymandered notion of symmetry
is defined. If our interest is in characterising background independence, why
not simply characterise it as the lack of absolute objects and be done with
it? In particular, the detour via symmetry∗ does not give us a better handle
on GR’s background independence versus SR’s background dependence.
8 Diff(M) as a Variational Symmetry Group
When physicists talk of a generally-covariant formulation of a specially rela-
tivistic theory, they typically have in mind a formulation like SR1. Undue
focus on such examples, at the expense of examples like SR2, might ex-
plain why the connection between background independence and diffeomor-
phism invariance is sometimes taken to be tighter than it really is. However,
theories along the lines of SR2 do get considered by those who defend a
diffeomorphism-invariance/background-independence link. As we have seen,
the possibility of such formulations of specially relativistic theories is central
to Anderson’s thinking (and explains the idiosyncrasies of his definition of
symmetry). The option is also considered by Rovelli, who concedes:
even full diffeomorphism invariance, should probably not be interpreted as a rigid
selection principle, capable of selecting physical theories just by itself. With suf-
ficient acrobatics, any theory can perhaps be re-expressed in a diffeomorphism
invariant language. . . .
But there are prices to pay. First, [SR2]. . . has a “fake” dynamical field, since
g is constrained to a single solution up to gauges, by the second equation of the
system. Having no physical degrees of freedom, g is physically a fixed background
field, in spite of the trick of declaring it a variable and then constraining the
33 Invariance, as I defined it in Section 4, is called covariance by Anderson (1967, 75).
He defines a theory’s symmetry, or “invariance” group as the “largest subgroup of the
covariance group. . . which is simultaneously the symmetry group of its absolute objects”
(Anderson, 1967, 87). It would seem, therefore, that Anderson’s symmetry group is
related to the notion of symmetry∗ in exactly the way the group of automorphisms of
the fixed fields of a theory is related the symmetry group (as defined in Section 4) of
that theory. In both cases one should expect the former to be a (possibly proper) subset
of the latter. But we have just seen that, without some finessing, the symmetry∗ group
of a theory will be trivial. The same trouble afflicts a flatfooted reading of Anderson’s
definition. Consider SR2. The symmetry group of any particular absolute gµν , occurring
in a particular DPM, will be (isomorphic to) the Poincaré group (cf. Anderson, 1967,
87), but the only diffeomorphism that belongs to every such group is the identity map.
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variable to a single solution. Second, we can insist on a lagrangian formulation of
the theory. . . (Sorkin, 2002), but to do this we must introduce an additional field,
and it can then be argued that the resulting theory, having an additional field is
different from [the original] (Earman, 1989). (Rovelli, 2007)
Several comments are in order. First, reference to “sufficient acrobatics”
seems like hyperbole, given the relatively straightforward nature of the tran-
sition from a theory like SR1 to a reformulation along the lines of SR2.
Second, it is true that, in SR2, gab is a “fake” dynamical field. It should
be classified as background structure. Despite our treating it as dynamical
in the liberal sense, it remains non-dynamical in a stricter sense. The previ-
ous sections have reviewed apparatus that allows us to draw precisely these
distinctions, and to differentiate GR1 and SR2, despite both theories being
equally diffeomorphism invariant. So, it is not clear why there is a “price
to pay” in adopting such a formulation, particularly since we are regarding
SR2 as merely a reformulation of SR1. Rovelli, perhaps, would question
this last stance. The diffeomorphism invariance of any theory might be taken
to have significant implications for the nature of the true physical magni-
tudes of the theory, and thus require that one distinguish SR2 from (the
non-diffeomorphism-invariant) SR1. If so, I disagree, for reasons I explain in
the final section of this paper.
Third, and most interestingly, Rovelli’s description of the second cost sug-
gests a quite different way to connect the question of whether diffeomorphisms
are symmetries to background independence. Prima facie, there is a formal
difference between SR2 and GR1 that I have not so far mentioned. The two
theories are defined on the same space of KPMs. In the case of GR1, the
space of solutions picked out by its equations can also be fixed via a vari-
ational problem defined in terms of the action SGR1 =
∫
d4x(LG + LΦ).34
On the face of it, the same is not true of SR2. One can pick out the solu-
tion space of SR1 in terms of a variational problem, defined via the action
SSR1 =
∫
d4xLΦ, where LΦ depends on the fixed metric field ηab. In the con-
text of the space of KPMs common to GR1 and SR2, however, elements in
the solution space of SR2 are not stationary points of
∫
d4xLΦ. The latter
can identified by considering the Euler–Lagrange equations one obtains by
applying Hamilton’s principle to both Φ and gab. From the first, one gets
the Klein–Gordon equation, but from the second one gets the trivialising
condition that the stress-energy tensor for Φ vanishes.
These reflections might suggest that background independence could be
linked to the symmetry status of Diff(M) in the following way:
Background Independence (version 1). A theory T is background inde-
pendent if and only if it can be formulated in terms of a variational problem
for which Diff(M) is a variational symmetry group.
34 The “gravitational” part of the Lagrangian is the Einstein–Hilbert Lagrangian LG =√−gκR, where R is the curvature scalar and κ is a suitable constant. The “matter” term
is the standard Lagrangian for the massless Klein–Gordon field: LΦ = √−ggab∇aΦ∇bΦ.
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Although one can write an action for SR1 in a generally-covariant or
coordinate-independent manner, Diff(M) is not a symmetry group of the
variational problem that defines the theory’s models.35 Recall that the action
of Diff(M) on the SR1’s space of KPMs acts on Φ but not on ηab, and does
not leave the space of DPMs invariant. A useful alternative way of stating
the proposed condition is as follows:
Background Independence (version 2). A theory T is background inde-
pendent if and only if its solution space is determined by a generally covariant
action all of whose dependent variables are subject to Hamilton’s principle.
This rules out the generally-covariant version of the SR1 action principle,
since in this case only Φ and not ηab is subject to Hamilton’s principle. It will
also rule out SR2 if the solution space of this theory really is not obtainable
from an appropriately formulated action principle.
Despite these promising results, the proposal does not work. In the quo-
tation above, Rovelli refers to Sorkin (2002). In that paper, Sorkin, rediscov-
ering a procedure originally employed by Rosen (1966), shows how one can
derive equations (4) and (9) from a diffeomorphism-invariant action. One
obtains a Sorkin-type action by replacing LG in SGR1 with a different “grav-
itational” term, LS = √−gΘabcdRabcd. The theory therefore involves a La-
grange multiplier field, Θabcd, in addition to the fields common to SR2 and
GR1. In this new action, all the dependent variables are to be subject to
Hamilton’s principle. For ease of reference, let us call the resulting theory
(so formulated) SR3. Varying Θabcd leads to equation (9). Since Φ does not
occur in LS , varying this field has the same effect as in GR1, and leads to
the Klein–Gordon equation (4). (One also needs to consider variations of gab.
Rather than the EFE, this leads to an equation that relates Θabcd, gab and
Φ.)36
Let us assume, for the moment, that in SR3 we have yet another way to
formulate the specially relativistic theory that has been our example through-
out this paper. Since its models are determined by a diffeomorphism-invariant
action, all of whose dependent variables are subject to Hamilton’s principle,
the theory counts as background independent according to our latest pro-
posal. The proposal therefore needs to be revised. A natural thought is to
amend it as follows:
Background Independence (version 3). A theory T is background inde-
pendent if and only if its solution space is determined by a generally-covariant
action: (i) all of whose dependent variables are subject to Hamilton’s princi-
ple, and (ii) all of whose dependent variables represent physical fields.
35 See Belot (2007, 161–2) for further discussion of the notion of a variational symmetry.
36 Note that the evolution of Θabcd is constrained by, but does not affect the evolutions
of gab and Φ. The action–reaction principle is therefore violated by Φ, with respect to
Θabcd, and not just by gab. The theory illustrates that requiring that all of the dependent
variables in an action be subject to Hamilton’s principle does not entail that the resulting
theory satisfies the action–reaction principle, pace Baez (2000).
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The idea is that SR3 fails to satisfy the second of these conditions because
the dynamics of the additional field Θabcd strongly suggest that it is not a
physical field. It makes no impact on the evolution of gab and Φ and hence,
were it a genuine element of reality, it would be completely unobservable (on
the natural assumption that our empirical access to it would be through its
effect on “standard” matter fields such as Φ). Indeed, it is only on the basis
of interpreting Θabcd as a mere mathematical device that one can view SR3
as a reformulation of SR2.
In the quotation at the start of this section, Rovelli suggests that one might
instead regard SR3 as a different theory from SR2, on the grounds that SR3
involves an additional field (presumably because one views this field as repre-
senting a genuine element of reality, the points just made notwithstanding).
This might seem to provide an alternative way to argue that our revised pro-
posal does not classify SR2 as background independent on the basis of SR3’s
satisfying its conditions: if SR3 is a different theory, it clearly does not show
that the solutions of SR2 can be derived from a diffeomorphism-invariant
action.
While this might get the classification of SR2 correct, it does so at the cost
of misclassifying SR3. According to the current suggestion, SR3 now is a
theory that meets the conditions for being background independent. But this
is not the right result. The fact the the equation of motion for its metric field
is derived from a diffeomorphism-invariant action expressed only in terms of
physical fields, hardly makes that metric more dynamical than the metric of
SR2. After all, they both obey exactly the same equation of motion. And once
this problem is recognised, reclassifyingΘabcd as unphysical does not seem like
enough to salvage the proposal. Even if SR3 is no longer a counterexample,
might there not be a relevantly similar theory that the proposal incorrectly
classifies as background independent? The Rosen–Sorkin method is not the
only way to construct a diffeomorphism-invariant variational problem for
a theory that involves non-dynamical fields. These alternative procedures
arguably provide examples of exactly the type envisaged.
One such procedure, developed by Karel Kuchař, is parameterization. In
the simplest case one starts with the Lorentz-covariant expression for the ac-
tion, defined with respect to inertial frame coordinates. Note that the field ηab
does not explicitly occur in this expression. One then treats the four coordi-
nate fields Xµ of this formulation as themselves dependent variables (“clock
fields”), writes them as functions of arbitrary coordinates, Xµ = Xµ(xν),
and re-expresses the Lagrangian in terms of these new variables. Hamilton’s
principle is applied to the original dynamical variables, now conceived of as
functions of xν , and to the coordinate fields, Xµ. In our simple example
of SR1, stationarity under variations of Φ leads to an equation for Φ and
Xµ that is satisfied just if Φ satisfies the standard Lorentz-covariant Klein–
Gordon equation (1) with respect to the Xµ. Stationarity under variations of
the Xµ yields equations that are automatically satisfied if the first equation is
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satisfied (see, e.g., Varadarajan, 2007, §II.A). Let us call the resulting theory
SR4.
Another technique is described by Lee and Wald (1990, 734).37 Let the
KPMs of SR5 be defined in terms of two maps from the spacetime manifold,
M . One is our familiar scalar field Φ. The other is a diffeomorphism y into
a copy of spacetime, M˜ , that is equipped with a particular flat Lorentzian
metric field. One can use the diffeomorphism y to pull back the metric on
M˜ onto M , and use the result, gab(y), to define the standard Lagrangian,
LΦ(y, Φ) =
√
−g(y)g(y)ab(∇aΦ)(∇bΦ), and action functional S =
∫
d4xLΦ.
To determine the theory’s solutions we require that S is stationary under
variations in both of the theory’s fundamental variables, y and Φ. Φ variations
give us that Φ satisfies the Klein–Gordon equation with respect to gab(y).
Variations in y give equations that involve the vanishing of terms that are
proportional to ∇nT nb, where T ab is the stress-energy tensor for Φ. Since
∇nT nb = 0 follows from the Klein–Gordon equation, these equations are
automatically satisfied.
Both SR4 and SR5 are examples of theories defined by diffeomorphism-
invariant actions all of whose dependent variables are subject to Hamilton’s
principle. They will therefore be counterexamples to our latest proposal just
if (i) they are background dependent and (ii) all of their fields are physical
fields. One way to explore whether (i) and (ii) are satisfied is to consider how
the theories relate to SR2. In particular, if they count as reformulations of
SR2, then they are formulations of a background dependent theory.
First, recall that a model of SR2 is a triple of the form 〈M, gab, Φ〉, where
gab is flat. A model of SR4, is of the form 〈M,Φ,X0, X1, X2, X3〉. That is,
it lacks a (primitive) field gab, and includes instead four scalar fields. Finally,
models of SR5 are of the form 〈M, y, Φ〉, where y is a diffeomorphism into
M˜ , a copy of M equipped with a fixed metric.
For both SR4 and SR5, there is a natural map from that theory’s solution
space to the solution space of SR2. For SR4, one first defines the unique
flat metric field gXab associated with the fields X
µ (the metric for which the
Xµ are everywhere Riemmann–normal coordinates). One then requires that
the map associates 〈M,Φ,X0, X1, X2, X3〉 with 〈M, gab, Φ〉 just if gXab = gab.
For SR5, 〈M, y, Φ〉 maps to 〈M, gab, Φ〉 just if g(y)ab = gab. In the first case,
the map is many-one. The solution space of SR4 is intuitively ‘bigger’ than
that of SR2. In the case of SR5, however, the map is a bijection.
This machinery helps articulate how both SR4 and SR5 can naturally be
viewed as reformulations of SR2.38 First, consider SR4. For any model of
SR2 one can choose special coordinates that encode its metric via the require-
37 See Belot (2007, 206–9) for an extended discussion of this example.
38 A similar observation can be made concerning SR3. Its models are of the form
〈M,gab, Φ,Θabcd〉 and the map from its solution space to that of SR2 simply involves
throwing away Θabcd: 〈M,gab, Φ, Θabcd〉 7→ 〈M,gab, Φ〉. This map is many-one, but the
differences between SR3 models mapped to the same SR2 model concern differences in
the non-physical field Θabcd.
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ment that, in these coordinate systems, gab = diag(−1, 1, 1, 1). In order to
understand SR4 as a reformulation of SR2, one interprets the fundamental
fields of SR4 to be such coordinate fields. So interpreted, SR4 is a formu-
lation of a background-dependent theory, since SR2 is. Do the Xµ count as
“physical fields”? Unlike the Θabcd of SR3, they certainly encode something
physical, since they encode the metrical facts. But there is also a sense in
which they do not themselves directly represent something physical: coordi-
nate systems are not physical objects. Note also that encoding a flat metric
via special coordinates in the manner proposed does not uniquely determine
the coordinates. If {Xµ} corresponds to one such set of fields, then so will any
set {X ′µ} where the X ′µ are related to the Xµ by a Poincaré transformation.
This is the source of the fact that the map from models of SR4 to those
of SR2 is many-one. This means that (on the suggested interpretation our
formalism) the {Xµ} contain some redundancy; “internal” Poincaré transfor-
mations Xµ 7→ X ′µ should be regarded as mere gauge re-descriptions.
The nature of the bijection between the solution space of SR5 and that
of SR2 makes their interpretation as reformulations of the same background-
dependent theory even more straightforward. Are SR5’s basic variables phys-
ical fields? The dynamical role of y is exhausted by its use to define the
pull-back metric on M . It is only through this metric that y enters into the
Lagrangian of the theory. Nonetheless, there is again a clear sense in which
the machinery involves arbitrary elements that do not represent the physical
facts directly. In particular, we might have set up the theory in terms of a
different (but still flat) metric on the target manifold. As a mathematical
object, this would constitute a different formulation of the theory, and yet
the difference does not show up at the level of the pulled-back metrics on
M : the same range of metrics for M is surveyed, just via different maps to a
different object.
The upshot is that it is not clear whether SR4 and SR5, interpreted as
reformulations of SR2, constitute counterexamples to the proposed criterion
for background independence. All hinges on whether the relevant fields count
as physical fields. They clearly encode physical facts but, equally clearly,
they do not do so in the most perspicuous manner. One might seek to solve
this dilemma via further proscriptive modifications to the proposal. This, of
course, risks creating further problems.39 More importantly, one should recog-
nise that we are now far past the point where one might hope to articulate a
simple and illuminating connection between diffeomorphism invariance and
background independence.
Rovelli writes:
Diffeomorphism invariance is the key property of the mathematical language used
to express the key conceptual shift introduced with GR: the world is not formed
by a fixed non-dynamical spacetime structure, which defines localization and on
39 For example, does the metric field of GR1 represent the physical facts in the most
perspicuous manner? If GR1 is not to count as fully background independent, it should
not be on account of this type of failure.
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which the dynamical fields live. Rather, it is formed solely by dynamical fields
in interactions with one another. Localization is only defined, relationally, with
respect to the fields themselves. (Rovelli, 2007, 1312)
The moral of our investigation so far is that diffeomorphism invariance can-
not be taken to express the shift from non-dynamical to only dynamical space-
time structures. Theories with non-dynamical structure can be formulated in
a fully diffeomorphism-invariant manner. But note that Rovelli’s description
of the key conceptual shift introduced with GR involves two elements. In
addition to the move from non-dynamical to dynamical spacetime, there is
the claim that, in GR, “localization is only defined, relationally, with respect
to the fields themselves.” I agree that this is how one should understand
diffeomorphism-invariant theories. What the existence of diffeomorphism-
invariant formulations of theories with non-dynamical structure indicates,
however, is that this feature of a theory is not peculiar to theories that lack
non-dynamical fields. A diffeomorphism-invariant, relational approach to “lo-
calization” is as appropriate in the context of Newtonian physics and special
relativity as it is in GR. A defence of this claim is the task of the last two
sections.
9 An Aside on the Gauge Status of Diff(M)
My central claim is this: the observable content of, and the nature of the
genuine physical magnitudes of, a specially relativistic theory, whether for-
mulated along the lines of SR1 or SR2, are identical in nature to those of
an analogue generally relativistic theory, such as GR1. In the next section
I will spell out how this can be so. In this section, I say a little about when
one should interpret diffeomorphisms as gauge transformations.
In the previous section, we saw that Rovelli claimed that SR3 might be
distinguished from SR2 on the grounds that the former involves an addi-
tional field. In the passage quoted above, he cites Earman, who does indeed
argue that one should distinguish SR3 from more standard formulations of
specially relativistic Klein–Gordon theory. Earman’s reasoning, however, is
rather different from Rovelli’s.
Earman (2006b) defines (massive variants of) SR1, SR2 and SR3, via
the analogues of the equations considered earlier in this paper.40 (To ease
exposition, I use this paper’s labels to refer to Earman’s theories.) He is pri-
marily concerned with the comparison between SR1 (as obtained from an
action principle) and SR3. Earman’s reasons for differentiating the theories,
unlike Rovelli’s, have nothing directly to do with the presence of an addi-
tional field. He views the theories as distinct because he believes that, in the
40 His equation (3) (Earman, 2006b, 451) is (once corrected) the massive analogue of my
(3), and defines his SR1-type theory. His equations (5) and (6) (Earman, 2006b, 455)
are the analogues of (4) and (9), and define his SR2-type theory.
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context of SR1, Φ can be treated as an observable but, in SR3, it cannot
because: (i) only gauge-invariant quantities are observable and (ii) one should
regard the Diff(M) symmetry of SR3 as a gauge symmetry. Earman takes
(ii) to be justified by the fact that Diff(M) is both a local and a variational
symmetry group in the context of SR3. In reaching this judgement in this
way, he takes himself to be applying a “uniform method for getting a fix on
gauge that applies to any theory in mathematical physics whose equations
of motion/field equations are derivable from an action principle” and that is
“generally accepted in the physics community” (Earman, 2002, 19).
As I have argued elsewhere (Pooley, 2010), the fact that this apparatus
tells us that Diff(M) is not a gauge group of SR1 is not surprising. Diff(M)
is not a symmetry group of SR1 and so a fortiori it is not a gauge symmetry
group. What one really wishes to know is whether one should view Diff(M)
as a gauge group of SR2. Earman does not address this question head-on,
but one suspects that his answer would be in the negative, for he argues that
the solution sets of SR1 and SR2 are the same (Earman, 2006b, 455). This,
of course, simply cannot be correct. It cannot be the case that (i) Diff(M) is
not a symmetry group of SR1; (ii) Diff(M) is a symmetry group of SR2; and
(iii) the solution sets of SR1 and SR2 are the same. It is (iii) that should
be given up, and it will be instructive to see where Earman’s argument goes
wrong.
Here is what he says:
The solution sets for [SR1] and for [SR2] are the same, at least on the assumption
that the spacetime manifold is R4. For then there is a global coordinate system
{xµ} such that gµν = ηµν (where ηµν is the Minkowski matrix) solves [(9)]. More-
over, in this coordinate system [(4)] reduces to [(3)41]. And every solution of [(9)]
can be transformed, by a suitable coordinate transformation, into a solution of
the form gµν = ηµν . Thus, every solution of [SR2] is a solution of [SR1]. Similar
reasoning shows that the converse is also true. (Earman, 2006b, 455, 466, n 26)
This argument, effectively, ignores the distinction between fields that are so-
lutions to equations and fields that feature in equations as fixed fields. Here
is one way to see the error. Fix a coordinate system K on M (of the kind
Earman considers). Relative to K, ηab always has the same components in
the coordinate representation of every solution of SR1. Every one of these
coordinate descriptions is also a description with respect to K of a solution
of SR2. But, in addition to these, every possible set of coordinate functions
that one can obtain from the original sets by acting by a diffeomorphism on
R
4 also describes—still relative to K—a solution of SR2. Note, too, that
each of these additional sets of coordinate functions corresponds (relative to
K) to a representation of a (mathematically, though not necessarily physi-
cally) distinct solution of SR2. But these new coordinate functions are not
41 Since Earman refers to ηµν as the Minkowski matrix, and since he has switched from
Roman indices—which I interpret as signalling coordinate-free, abstract index notation—
to Greek indices, it would seem more appropriate to refer to his equation (2), i.e., to
equation (1), rather than to his (3).
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descriptions of solutions of SR1 relative to K (the components of the metric
tensor have been changed, so they no longer describe ηab).
42
I conclude that Earman’s claims do not speak against the natural interpre-
tation of Diff(M) as a gauge group of SR2. His own favoured apparatus is
simply silent on the question. When physicists themselves justify the use of
the apparatus to identify gauge freedom, they take the deterministic nature
of the theories in question as a premise (see, e.g., Dirac, 1964, 20). In the
context of SR2, this premise also leads to the conclusion that Diff(M) is a
gauge group. In fact, Belot (2008) shows how one can regiment the intuitions
that are arguably behind such arguments in order to define a notion of gauge
equivalence that matches Earman’s favoured notion in its verdicts concerning
Lagrangian theories but which applies more widely. Unsuprisingly, Belot’s def-
inition tells us that Diff(M) is a gauge group of SR2. There remains just one
task. We need to see how this interpretative stance with respect to SR2 can
be reconciled with an relatively orthodox account of nature of the observables
of both background-dependent SR and background-independent GR.
10 On the Meaning of Coordinates
Recall, again, the similarities betweenGR1 and SR2. The two theories share
a space of KPMs. They differ only in terms of which subsets of this space are
picked out as dynamically possible. The DPMs of each theory, although dis-
tinct sets of mathematical objects, are sets of the same kind of objects. That
much is mathematical fact. These similarities, I submit, make plausible the
following interpretative stance: one should treat the two theories uniformly.
On this view, the physical magnitudes of the two theories describe the same
types of physical objects. The theories postulate the same kind of stuff; they
just differ over which configurations of this stuff are physically possible.
Why might one reject such a view? The reason, I think, has to do with a
popular, but potentially misleading, way of thinking about the coordinates
of non-generally-covariant formulations of pre-relativistic theories. As I will
describe in a moment, this way of thinking about the coordinates of, for ex-
ample, Lorentz-invariant theories has implications for how one conceives of
the content of those theories. It leads to a way of thinking about the theory’s
physical content that does not transfer to theories without special coordinates.
The lack of non-dynamical background fields entails (though, as we saw, can-
not be equated with) the lack of such coordinates. It is therefore natural to
see the shift from SR to GR, in which background structures are excised, as
heralding a radical change in the nature of the content of our physical theo-
42 They can be understood as descriptions of solutions of SR1, but only if we allow
ourselves to describe things with respect to coordinate systems other than K (in fact,
we need to consider one coordinate system for each class related by Poincaré transforma-
tions). And when we do this, each solution of SR1 is, of course, multiply represented.
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ries. Against this, I want to highlight an alternative way of conceiving of the
special coordinates of a non-covariant physics. This alternative way is per-
fectly compatible with the fundamental nature of the content of our physics
remaining unchanged in the passage from background dependence to back-
ground independence. It also provides an independently plausible account of
the content of background dependent-theories, such as SR.
The influence of the problematic view might well flow from the following
passage in Einstein’s groundbreaking paper on special relativity:
The theory to be developed—like every other electrodynamics—is based upon the
kinematics of rigid bodies, since the assertions of any such theory concern relations
between rigid bodies (systems of coordinates), clocks, and electromagnetic processes.
(Einstein, 1905, 38, my emphasis)
Einstein seems here to be claiming that the meaning of the theoretical claims
of Lorentz-invariant electromagnetism—that is, what those claims are fun-
damentally about—concerns the relationships between electromagnetic phe-
nomena and rods and clocks. In other words, the content of the theory’s
claims is held to be about relationships between electromagnetic phenomena
and material bodies outside of the electromagnetic system under study.
Versions of this type of view, as an interpretation of the special coordinates
of specially-relativistic and Newtonian physics, are explicitly endorsed by, for
example, Stachel (1993, 141–2), Westman and Sonego (2009, 1592–3) and, in
several places, Rovelli. To give a flavour of the importance of the view for
Rovelli, I quote at length:
For Newton, the coordinates x that enter his main equation
F = m
d2x(t)
dt2
(2.152)
are the coordinates of absolute space. However, since we cannot directly observe
space, the only way we can coordinatize space points is by using physical objects.
The coordinates x. . . are therefore defined as distances from a chosen system O of
objects, which we call a “reference frame”. . .
In other words, the physical content of (2.152) is actually quite subtle:
There exist reference objects O with respect to which the motion of any other
object A is correctly described by (2.152). . .
Notice also that for this construction to work it is important that the objects O
forming the reference frame are not affected by the motion of the object A. There
shouldn’t be any dynamical interaction between A and O. (Rovelli, 2004, 87–8)43
The similarity with Einstein’s claim is clear. The “physical content” of an
equation of restricted covariance turns out to involve claims about relations
43 A similar claim is found in Rovelli (1997, 187–9). There Rovelli combines the claim that
in pre-relativistic physics “reference system objects are not part of the dynamical system
studied, their motion. . . is independent from the dynamics of the system studied” with
the further assertion that the “mathematical expression” of the failure of this condition
in GR is “the invariance of Einstein’s equations under active diffeomorphisms.”
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between the dynamical quantities that are explicitly represented in the equa-
tions and other material bodies that are only implicitly represented via the
special coordinates. There is one difference worth noting. For Einstein, the
important role of external bodies is to make meaningful spatial and tempo-
ral intervals; the bodies in question are rods and clocks. Rovelli, in contrast,
emphasises two other roles played by the bodies of his reference system: they
fix a particular coordinate system (define its origin) and, more importantly,
they define same place over time. In fact, in spelling out his notion of a ma-
terial reference system, Rovelli seems to take the notion of spatial distance
as primitive and empirically unproblematic.
Now contrast this Einstein–Stachel–Rovelli (ESR) way of understanding
special coordinates to what I will call the Anderson–Trautman–Friedman
(ATF) perspective (recall footnote 13), which has already been adopted
throughout in this paper. According to this latter view, a generally-covariant
formulation of a theory has the advantage over formulations of limited co-
variance of making the physical content of the theory fully explicit. This
content includes certain spatiotemporal structures, such as those encoded by
the Minkowski metric field ηab. In cases where these structures are highly
symmetric, one can encode certain physical quantities (e.g., spatiotemporal
intervals) via special choices of coordinates adapted to these structures. New-
ton’s special coordinates are not fundamentally defined in terms of, and New-
ton’s equations do not make implicit reference to, external material bodies.
Rather they are equations that encode physically meaningful chronometric
and inertial structure, via certain “gauge fixing” coordinate conditions.44
In order to avoid confusion, let me stress that according to both the ESR
view and the ATF view the special coordinates of a non-covariant form of
pre-relativistic physics have a different meaning to arbitrary coordinates in
GR (or a generally covariant form of the pre-relativistic theory). On both
views the special coordinates have physical meaning. The accounts just differ
over what that physical meaning is.
To help further clarify the differences between two views, let me highlight
three distinct features that concrete applications of coordinate systems must
or may have.
1. The coordinate system must be anchored to the world in some way. If it
is to be concretely applied, and predictively effective, we must be able to
practically determine which coordinate values particular observable events
are to be assigned.
2. The coordinate system might be anchored to the world by observable ma-
terial objects outside of the system under study. (The system under study
might be a proper subsystem of the universe.)
44 Specifically, one imposes Γµνρ = 0, tµ = (1, 0, 0, 0) and h
µν = diag(0, 1, 1, 1), where
Γ
µ
νρ are the components of the connection, tµ are the components of the one-form that
defines the temporal metric and hµν are the components of the spatial metric.
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3. The coordinate system might partially encode, or be partially defined in
terms of, physically meaningful spatiotemporal quantities (spacetime inter-
vals; inertial trajectories etc.). In order for this to be applied in concrete
cases, we require physical systems that disclose these facts. Further, these
systems may or may not be external to the system being modelled by our
theory.
The ATF perspective wholly concerns the third point: the special coor-
dinates of non-generally-covariant formulations of theories encode physical
magnitudes. It is simply silent on the issues raised in the first two points.
The ESR perspective assumes such encoding too, but it makes various fur-
ther commitments concerning how such coordinate systems are anchored to
the world, and what kind of systems disclose the magnitudes that the coor-
dinate systems encoded. It is important to see that these additional claims
are not necessary concomitants of the idea that there is such encoding.
To see this, consider how one might in practice get one’s hands on an
ATF special coordinate system. The coordinates encode spatial intervals and
temporal intervals. So one needs to be able to measure spatial and temporal
intervals. But without further argument, one’s ability to measure these should
not be taken to require that the rods and clocks one uses are outside the
system that one is describing, much less outside the scope of the theory one is
using. Note that such spatiotemporal measurement is equally essential to the
concrete application of GR, not now to give meaning to special coordinates,
but to give empirical content to one of the dynamical fields that is explicitly
described.
The ESR idea that, necessarily, special coordinates in pre-relativistic
physics gain their meaning from material systems outside the system being
studied, blurs the distinction between (i) coordinates encoding physical mag-
nitudes that are disclosed by systems not covered by the theory in question
and (ii) the coordinates being anchored to the world via material systems out-
side the system under study. Rovelli’s idea that “localisation” is inherently
non-relational in pre-relativistic physics really only relies on (ii). However, it
is easy to see that (ii) is not an intrinsic feature of the special coordinates of
pre-relativistic physics. Even if in practice we often use physical systems to
measure spatiotemporal intervals (and thereby fix the “magnitude-encoding”
aspect of the coordinate system) that we do not (or cannot) actually model in
our theory, the anchoring of particular coordinates to the world might simply
involve the stipulation that some qualitatively characterisable components of
the system under study are to be given such-and-such coordinate values.
Consider the case of a Lorentz-covariant formulation of our theory of the
specially-relativistic scalar field, for which Φ(x) is supposed to be an “observ-
able”, in contrast to the analogous quantity in GR. If the special coordinate
system in terms of which Φ is being described is anchored to the world by
some reference system not described by the theory, and if the coordinates are
understood as encoding objective spatiotemporal quantities, then it is clear
what physical meaning Φ(x0) is supposed to have (for any given, particular
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x0) and what the difference in meaning is between the quantities Φ(x0) and
Φ(x0 + ∆x). However—and this is the absolutely crucial observation—such
coordinate representations of Φ can also be understood to be physically mean-
ingful (in essentially the same way) without understanding them in terms of
“non-relational localisation” thought of as provided by an external anchor for
the coordinate system.
Imagine, for example, that one measures Φ to take a certain value (at one’s
location). One stipulates that this value is to be given coordinate values x0.
45
One then asks what value the theory predicts that the field will take at a cer-
tain spatiotemporal distance away from the observed value. Since such spa-
tiotemporal distances are encoded in the coordinates of the Lorentz-covariant
formulation of the theory, this is to ask what the theory predicts the value
of Φ(x0 +∆x) will be, given the value of Φ(x0), where the coordinate differ-
ence ∆x encodes the spatiotemporal interval we are interested in. Note that,
conceived of in this way, Φ(x) and Φ(x+∆x) specify, not two independently
predictable quantities ultimately defined in terms of the relationship of Φ
to an unstated reference object, but a single diffeomorphism-invariant coinci-
dence quantity, involving how the variation of Φ is related to the underlying
metric field ηab.
If one considers Newtonian physics or special relativity as potentially pro-
viding complete cosmological theories, then any anchoring of special coordi-
nate systems has to be done, ultimately, in this second way. Moreover, any
systems that disclose the metric facts are, by hypothesis, describable by the
theory. Of course, this is not how we now understand the empirical applica-
bility of Newtonian physics or special relativity in the actual world. But the
point is that there is no logical incoherence in so conceiving of them. Indeed,
it was the interpretation each was assumed to have prior to 1905 and 1915
respectively. A theory’s including non-dynamical background fields does not,
per se, preclude such a cosmological interpretation.
To summarise, the additional commitments of the ESR interpretation of
coordinates, over those of the ATF view, are not necessary consequences of a
theory’s being background-dependent in the sense of involving non-dynamical
structure. The conditions that ESR write into the very meaning of all special
coordinate systems might correctly characterise some concrete applications
of such systems, but they need not do so. In fact, sometimes, they do not do
so. Consider, for example, a case whose philosophical importance is stressed
by Julian Barbour: the use of Newtonian mechanics by astronomers to de-
termine ephemeris time and the inertial frames.46 Here certain facts about
45 In reality, in order both to provide a uniquely identifying description of the field that
allows us to anchor the coordinate system, and to provide sufficient initial data that a
prediction can be extracted from the theory, one should really consider the observation of
a certain qualitatively characterisable and spatially extended continuum of field values.
This complication does not alter the basic structure of the story given in the text.
46 For a popular account that stresses the philosophical morals, see Barbour (1999,
Ch. 6)
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simultaneity and spatial distances are determined “externally”, but the way
the coordinate system is anchored to the world, and the way some of the
spatiotemporal quantities encoded by the coordinate system are determined
(time intervals and an inertial standard of equilocality) are not.
There is, perhaps, one qualification to be made. I have argued that, in
the context of classical background-dependent physics, the ESR story about
special coordinate systems does not provide an analysis of their fundamental
meaning. This, however, does not rule out something like the story being
correct for background-dependent quantum theory. In this context, the sug-
gestion would be that certain (non-quantum) background structure in the
theory, namely, Minkowski spacetime geometry, really does acquire physical
meaning via an implicit appeal to physical systems outside the scope of the
theory. Even if something along these lines were correct (and I register my
scepticism), the point to be stressed is that its correctness is not to be un-
derstood as flowing from the necessary meaning of such coordinate systems
in classical background-dependent physics.
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